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From Empire to Globalization... and Back?
A Post-Colonial View of Transjudicialism
HANNAH L. BUXBAUM*
From Empire to Globalization: The New Zealand Experience presents a
picture of a government at a fascinating historical moment-achieving full
status as an independent sovereign, ridding itself of the last vestiges of colonial-
ism, just as the forces of globalization are changing in such dramatic ways what
sovereignty means. Looking at this moment, Professor McLean analyzes not
globalization as an abstract force, but rather the deep institutional effects that
globalization has had on one nation's internal sovereignty. Her examination of
such developments as the expanded role of New Zealand's judiciary in inter-
preting human rights instruments, and the means by which international eco-
nomic instruments are incorporated into national legislation, reveals the impact
of globalization on New Zealand's system of parliamentary sovereignty as well
as the restraints that it imposes on the exercise of executive and legislative auton-
omy in the country. Throughout, her paper exposes ways in which certain ele-
ments of globalization echo elements of the country's earlier colonialism.
Much of Professor McLean's paper discusses the particular challenges that
globalization presents to the country's judicial system. In New Zealand courts,
the influence of the colonial institutions that bound New Zealand to an empire
is fading,' while international law-which will bind New Zealand to the global
community-is gaining strength. One aspect of this phenomenon that Professor
McLean discusses is the process by which the common law has become "more
permeable to human rights and other international law norms."2 This process is
part of a larger process of judicial globalization, and a question her paper raises
is what the experience of the judiciary in New Zealand might tell us about judi-
cial globalization more generally-how that experience might be used to test
*Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington. This is an expanded version of a comment delivered at a symposium on Globaliza-
tion and the Courts, April 2003, in response to Janet McLean, From Empire to Globalization: The
New Zealand Experience, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 161 (2004). I would like to thank Janet
McLean and also Wiebke Buxbaum and Larry Helfer for their helpful comments.
1. See the discussion regarding the end of the Privy Council review. Id. at 164-67].
2. Id. at 171.
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some of the claims that are being made regarding the emergence of a global
community of courts. In this comment, I will explore the ways in which the post-
colonial view of globalization that she presents exposes the issues of power and
status that continue to underpin transjudicialism.
Scholars analyzing the emerging transjudicial community point to a variety
of ways in which courts have become more global, including the increase in for-
mal and informal cooperation between courts (and individual judges) in differ-
ent jurisdictions, rearticulations of the notion of judicial comity in litigation
involving private parties, and the development of supranational tribunals.3 One
of the major pillars supporting this global community is a process that has been
described as "constitutional cross-fertilization."4 This cross-fertilization devel-
ops as national courts around the world look to foreign and international law in
adjudicating constitutional issues, particularly in the area of human rights.
Thus, the developments that Professor McLean identifies as affecting the inter-
nal sovereignty of New Zealand (for instance, the incorporation of international
human rights norms into New Zealand's Bill of Rights)5 are part of the creation
of this external global judicial community.
As observers of this phenomenon point out, the use of foreign or interna-
tional law in national courts is not entirely new-and, indeed, the example most
often pointed to of "old" style cross-fertilization is the role of imperial law in the
courts of the colonies. But now, as Anne-Marie Slaughter and others have ar-
gued, a different kind of cross-fertilization is developing-in their view, differ-
ent both as to its processes and as to its motives. The argument is that these
differences really do distinguish globalization from empire, marking the ways
in which the system of international law supporting conquest and colonization
has been replaced by a cosmopolitan, egalitarian system of international law.
3. See, e.g., Reem Bahdi, Globalization ofJudgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of Inter-
national Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555 (2002); Laurence R. Heifer and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towarda Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273
(1997); Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TuLSA L.J. 15 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter,A Typology of Trans-
judicial Communication, 29 U. RIcH. L. REV. 99 (1994) [hereinafter Typology]; Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter,Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial Globalization]; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003) [hereinafter Global
Community]; Symposium, Judicialization and Globalization of the Judiciary, 38 TEXAS INT'L L.J.
(Special 2003).
4. See, e.g.,Judicial Globalization,supra note 3, at 1104.
5. See McLean, supra note *, at 170-76.
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The process of cross-fertilization across courts today is of course vastly differ-
ent from what it was in the colonial era. As Professor McLean's paper notes, it was
critical that in all parts of the British Empire, the interpretation of the law be "as
nearly as possible the same."6 Thus, while local custom in each colony might have
had a particular formal status,7 and while the colonies may have felt themselves to
be part of the empire, it is doubtful that there was much of a two-way conversation
between the courts of the individual colonies and those of the imperial power in
which that law was created. Today, it is suggested, conversations among courts take
the form of a dialogue rather than a monologue; they are part of an interactive pro-
cess rather than one characterized by the segregation of courts that give norms from
those that receive them.8 Commentators point also to a difference in the way that
courts perceive their role in this process: for instance, in distinguishing this new
cross-fertilization from older mechanisms of judicial dialogue, Professor Slaughter
points to the "self-conscious construction of a global judicial community."9
Professor McLean's analysis suggests, however, that participation in this
process is experienced quite differently by different courts. The phrase "self-
conscious construction of a global judicial community" is a nice one precisely be-
cause there are two ways to read self-consciousness in this context. One refers to
self-conscious participation in the active sense-that is, the deliberate choice to
evaluate the rationales of other courts and also provide one's own rationales as
contributions to the developing dialogue." But another refers to self-conscious-
ness in the sense of an awareness of having to conform to a standard imposed by
the leading powers. In this sense, it seems that courts in some countries might
view their task not as joining in the creation of a global community, but rather as
obtaining the approval of the states that lead the global community." In the
6. Id. at 165 (quoting Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Cas. 342, 345 (P.C. 1879)).
7. Id. at 164- 65 & n.ll.
8. See L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 3, at 17 (suggesting that a system in which some courts give
standards and some receive has been replaced by "cross-pollination and dialogue between juris-
dictions," particularly in the area of human rights law).
9. Global Community, supra note 3, at 196.
10. Slaughter describes the "deep sense of participation in a common global enterprise of judg-
ing." Judicial Globalization, supra note 3, at 1104.
11. See Bahdi, supra note 3, at 557, 590-95 (identifying "concern to avoid negative assessments
from the international community" as one of the reasons that judges choose to invoke interna-
tional law); cf Typology, supra note 3, at 134 ("The court of a fledgling democracy, for instance,
might look to the opinions of courts in older and more established democracies as a way of bind-
ing its country to this existing community of states.").
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Tavita case discussed in Professor McLean's paper, Justice Cooke worried that
"legitimate criticism could extend to the New Zealand Courts if they were to ac-
cept the argument that [the executive is free to ignore international human
rights norms]."' 2 In an earlier New Zealand case, too, the court described certain
international treaties as representing "goals towards which members of the
United Nations are expected to work."'3 In such opinions, one hears a certain
tone of the court wanting to keep in step with the global community-much,
perhaps, as the colonies sought to belong to and be approved by the Common-
wealth.14 In other courts, by contrast, the judges may experience self-conscious-
ness in neither sense, choosing instead to remain relatively closed to
transjudicialism. In the United States Supreme Court, for instance, while some
Justices have referred to foreign and international law in their opinions on con-
stitutional issues,' 5 others have resisted that influence quite strongly. 6
Aside from such differences in judicial mindset, there are also substantial
differences in the context in which international norms are used in various
cases.' 7 The preamble to New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990, for example,
12. Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257, 266, discussed in McLean, supra
note *, 172-74.
13. Van Gorkom v. Attorney-General, [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 535, 543. Similar articulations are
found in decisions of other courts in countries including South Africa, Australia, India and
Tanzania. See generally Bahdi,supra note 3, at 590-91 (discussing cases from several countries).
14. See McLean, supra note *, at 166-67, 169.
15. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31, 851-52 (1988). For examples from the most recent Supreme
Court term, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (refer-
encing, in the opening of her opinion, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women) and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481 (Kennedy, J.) (2003) (citing
a decision of the European Court of Human Rights holding laws prohibiting homosexual conduct
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights). See also Justice Scalia's dissent in the
latter case, dismissing the majority's references to foreign law as "meaningless" and "dangerous"
dicta. Id. at 2495.
16. See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence should not "impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans");
see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (stating that comparative
analysis is "inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one"). See also L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 3, at 37-40 (criticizing
the Rehnquist Court's general unwillingness to utilize foreign law in its decision making).
17. See generally Bahdi, supra note 3 (analyzing five different reasons that judges choose to uti-
lize international law in the decision-making process); Typology, supra note 3.
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states not only that the statute affirms "human rights and fundamental freedoms
in New Zealand," but also that it affirms "New Zealand's commitment to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."' 8 Thus, the law expressly
indicates that harmonization with international norms is part of the legislative
intent, and therefore directs New Zealand courts to consider the jurisprudence
interpreting that instrument, wherever it emerges, in interpreting the particular
rights protected by the Act. That is of course very different from a situation in
which the court is interpreting a domestic constitutional standard that was not
itself derived from an international treaty or convention, and therefore reviews
decisions of foreign courts merely for information and persuasive arguments,
19
as some Justices of the United States Supreme Court have done.
20
All in all, these differences in the process of constitutional cross-fertilization
suggest that while the flow of international and foreign law into national courts
does not take the form of a monologue, as in the imperial era, it is not a full dia-
logue between equal partners either. While there may not be "giving" and "re-
ceiving" courts in the same sense as during the colonial period, the question is
whether all courts are in fact beginning to experience a shared commitment to
the transjudicial system, or whether old patterns are simply replicating them-
selves in a division between courts that approve and those that seek approval.
21
Commentators have suggested not only that the processes of judicial global-
ization are different from those of the colonial era, but also that the motives for
constructing today's global judicial community are new. (Although, as Professor
McLean suggests in her description of the Privy Council's role in the colonies,
18. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.); see also McLean, supra note *, at 170.
19. For instance, Bahdi distinguishes concern for the rule of law (where the judge feels that the
national court is bound to apply an international norm) from interest in the reasoning of foreign
courts (where the judge may choose whether to accept or reject the norm). Bahdisupra note 3, at
585-89.
20. See supra note 16.
21. In some respects, a court's awareness of and response to its standing in the global judicial
community may yield positive effects. For example, the influence of certain courts as "givers" of
international norms may wane if they continue to refrain from the dialogue in which others par-
ticipate, while the influence of others may rise as they participate actively in transjudicialism in
"deliberately seek[ing] to reestablish their place in a global judicial community." See Global Com-
munity, supra note 3, at 198; see also Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Trans-
plantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258-61 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D.
Donahue eds., 2000).
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the motives for imposing external norms on colonial courts were mixed in that
era as well: the use of imperial law in colonial courts was intended as a means of
protecting the "rights and liberties of British subjects in the colonies," and the
common law that it protected had "globalizing aspirations.""2 ) A primary mo-
tive behind the introduction of international norms into domestic constitutional
decision making today is ensuring basic protections of individual rights around
the globe-in part by using the power of national judiciaries to secure fair treat-
ment in each country of local citizens.23 Ensuring such basic protections is an un-
assailable priority, and the validity of processes that bring international human
rights norms to bear in national courts rests on the claim of human rights to uni-
versality. Even here, though, questions of relative power and authority are pre-
sented. Commentators have pointed to the danger of "judicial imperialism" in
the mechanisms by which human rights law of Western origin is spread in other
countries,2 4 and to local resistance created in part by the use of colonial institu-
tions for that purpose. 5 Even more problematic is the question of how power
and influence will affect transjudicialism outside the human rights field. First, it
seems possible that patterns and habits judges develop in one area may transfer
to their adjudication in others where the norms in question do not have such a
claim to universality. Second, judicial globalization is also simply a variety of
globalization of lawyers, and of law, that is largely economic in its origins.26
Here, in the economic sphere, the relative status of particular states in the inter-
national community-and the power of only some states to generate rather than
simply apply the international norms in question-are more clearly reflected in
the transjudicial process.
International economic instruments may present less of an immediate for-
mal challenge to New Zealand's system of parliamentary sovereignty than do
human rights instruments, due to the way in which they are negotiated and
22. See McLean, supra note *, at 164-65.
23. Indeed, it has been a strategic decision by human rights organizations to use national courts
in this way.
24. See Bahdi,supra note 3, at 597-99.
25. See Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832
(2002).
26. See Judicial Globalization, supra note 3, at 1113 (discussing "a kind of legal globalization that
is both cause and consequence of economic globalization").
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adopted. Nevertheless, Professor McLean notes, they present just as great a chal-
lenge to the domestic system in terms of actual impact in their present and future
implementation.27 Here, in the economic arena, the issues of power underlying
the source and implementation of international instruments are inescapable. As
Professor McLean points out, the influence of a small country like New Zealand
in the negotiation of the treaties whose norms will then be applied domestically
is more limited than the influence of a country like the United States.28 Thus, al-
though the multilateral process by which such treaties are developed creates at
least the potential for small countries to participate in coalitions that might bal-
ance the power of larger states,29 less powerful countries remain susceptible to
the imposition from the outside of a particular vision of economic governance-
a process that raises echoes of the imposition of imperial law on the colonies. As
Professor Hirschl argues elsewhere in this volume, constitutionalization may be
used not only to spread human rights but also to preserve hegemonic economic,
legal, and social relationships. 30
Professor McLean's paper provides a view from New Zealand of nation-
hood in an era of globalization. Asking the hard questions about power and
multilateralism and sovereignty that her paper invites is necessary to a fair eval-
uation of global processes and to the development of the best transjudicial prac-
tices possible.
27. McLean identifies, for example, the one-line incorporation of the TRIPs agreement into
New Zealand law. McLean, supra note *, at 177.
28. McLean, supra note *, at 176. For a discussion of the relative influence of states in developing
TRIPs, see Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Set-
ting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 765, 769-70 (2002).
29. McLean, supra note *, at 179.
30. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 INn. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 71, 84-86 (2004).
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